Senator Johnston

We have grown the ability to maintain and operate a complex and demanding platform like a submarine. The build and sustainment of the Collins has been an enormous challenge for Australia and, despite its well documented problems, the achievements of this program and class often get forgotten: We built and delivered 6 submarines over a construction period from 1990 to 2003. Our build quality was equal to and also exceeded the quality of sections of the first submarine that were built overseas. The build of the Collins class also overlapped the construction of the Anzac Class frigates in Australia. This program was marked by world-class performance in terms of build quality, cost, and schedule and demonstrated that we could manage two major maritime construction programs in Australia concurrently and deliver quality vessels. Enough for history, what about the future? Our election commitment was to make a decision on our Future Submarines within eighteen months of being elected. No-one should underestimate the priority I am giving this project. In Opposition I spent a significant amount of effort 'shining the light' on our then deeply troubled submarine force - the political pressure applied undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the Gillard government to give the submarine force its due regard. After four years of inactivity which saw our submarine availability fall away to alarming levels the Collins review, led by John Coles, was commissioned by the previous Government and the outcome of that review has seen a significant improvement in submarine availability. In the lead-up to the last election I threw my support behind Defence's charted course for the future submarine program - the suspension of investigations into option one (an existing off-the-shelf submarine design modified to meet Australia's regulatory requirements) and option two (an existing off the shelf submarine modified to incorporate Australia's specific requirements, including in relation to combat systems and weapons) and more detailed investigation of option three (an evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs, including the Collins Class) and option four (a new design). It is always difficult for a Shadow Defence Minister to gain a full appreciation on defence planning on account of the necessity for secrecy, and as such I placed a caveat on my support; I said at the Defence Debate in Adelaide that "if anything the Minister has said is based on fantasy, we'll tell you and we'll revisit this". I have now had extensive discussions with defence and access to a range of information previously denied me. Notwithstanding, I am still coming to terms with the complexities of intellectual property and our imperative to have sovereign control and proprietorship. As a government we want both low risk and high levels of capability for the ADF. Whilst such desires are not mutually exclusive the resolution and attainment of a viable balance between these competing imperatives is a highly complex and perpetual battle. Typically we would seek to achieve that through a military off the shelf acquisition - but this is not a typical acquisition. The balance between risk, capability and costs is a tough one, and not surprisingly, different areas of Defence, Government and Industry have very different perspectives on how to achieve that balance. It is fair to say I am still working the problem. A submarine design and build is one of the most complicated engineering projects a nation can undertake. And some of the more experienced countries have struggled to achieve excellence on every design occasion. My experience at Barrow on Furness highlighted to me the enormity of such a task. The considerable number of design and build engineers, and the complexity of modern submarine design and the cutting edge construction processes as a national asset was indeed impressive. Nevertheless, Australia did achieve something similar in the Collins submarine build programme. Can we repeat such success, avoiding some of technical and commercial issues that plagued the Collins? In truth for our requirements it is probably much more complex than this. It should be evident that our approach to our future submarine acquisition needs to be more comprehensive than just the introduction of a submarine. In fact I would say that there are four primary objectives for the future submarine enterprise. These are: To deliver an enduring regionally dominant conventional submarine capability; Ensure our new submarine capability is affordable; To ensure Australia is able to sustain a superior conventional submarine capability into the foreseeable future; and, To avoid a submarine capability gap. Let me tackle each of these in turn, drawing out where I believe we have some certainty and where we are still examining questions.